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Abstract
Designing dependable systems is complex and, whilst the state of the art goes
some way towards assisting in the design process, existing approaches have some
limitations. A case study is used to explore the available approaches and discuss
their benefits and limitations. Based on these observations, stochastic extensions
to the Event-B notation are proposed that build on the strengths of the existing
approaches and aim to address some of their limitations. This new language is
also trialled on the case study and shows some promise. The paper concludes with
some suggestions for further work in this area.
1 Introduction
The range and complexity of systems in which computers play a major part is ever
increasing. As complexity increases it becomes harder to design a computer-based
system that functions predictably. At the same time, greater reliance is being placed
on their correct functioning, in particular in those systems that are responsible for pre-
serving lives or livelihood. Providing the required increases in dependability is only
possible if the techniques for obtaining and assuring such dependability are continu-
ally improved and updated.
There are already many techniques and tools used for modelling and analysing de-
pendable computer systems. However, the existing approaches tend to fall into two
distinct research areas, which we shall term: formal methods and dependability. For-
mal methods use “mathematically-based languages, techniques, and tools for specify-
ing and verifying computer-based systems” [5]. Formal methods concentrate on the
functionality of a program, with the goal being to prove that a program is correct with
respect to a specification of its functionality. Dependability is defined by Avizienis
et. al [3] as “the ability to deliver service that can justifiably be trusted”. As such,
dependability research concentrates on evaluating the quality of service aspects of a
computing system, such as availability (readiness for correct service) and reliability
(continuity of correct service). Such evaluation usually takes place quite late in the
development process.
There is currently a gap between these two areas, with a limited body of research
that attempts to combine the two ways of thinking. This paper focusses on a promising
bridge between formal methods and dependability; that of using quantitative formal
methods to assist in the design of a dependable system.
In order to analyse the stochastic behaviour of a system a formal language is first
needed to express such behaviour. An ideal language would:
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• be easy to understand and analyse - especially providing extra insight into the
system during the design phase
• allow analysis of a variety of stochastic systems - particularly those exhibiting
continuous behaviour
• be supported by a useful toolkit
• allow separation of concerns - functional and stochastic behaviour can be anal-
ysed separately where appropriate
A simple case study, adapted from a real industrial problem, is used to explore
the existing approaches for designing dependable systems. These existing approaches
fall into two main categories – those based on Continuous Time Markov Chains (see
Section 1.2.1) and those based on theorem proving (see Section 1.2.2). One language
from each of these approaches is investigated in more detail; the benefits and limitations
of each are analysed.
Based on our observations of the existing approaches, a new approach is proposed
to address some of the uncovered limitations. This new approach involves extending
Event-B [2] with suitable stochastic behaviour.
The contribution of this paper is two-fold: first it provides an overview of the state
of the art in modelling dependable systems; second it proposes a new approach for
modelling dependable systems that addresses limitations of current solutions.
The paper is structured as follows: in the remainder of this section the case study
(used as a basis for comparison) is introduced, and an overview of the existing ap-
proaches for designing dependable systems is provided. In Section 2 PRISM is intro-
duced and our experiences of modelling in this language are demonstrated. In Sec-
tion 3 probabilistic extensions to B (pB) are introduced and this approach is analysed.
In Section 4 Event-B is introduced and suitable stochastic extensions to this language
are proposed before being applied to the case study. In Section 5 further work to de-
velop the approach (as outlined in Section 4) is considered. Finally, conclusions are
presented in Section 6.
1.1 Case Study Overview
The case study is a simplified scenario derived from the Deploy project1. A vehicle
has an emergency brake (EB) that can either be applied (the brake is on and the vehicle
is stopping) or not applied (the brake is off and has no effect on the speed of the car).
Some external system (either a person or another computer system) can command the
brake to be applied at any time.
The emergency brake system can fail in two possible ways:
• An unsafe failure occurs when the emergency brake has been commanded, but
not applied
• A safe failure occurs when the emergency brake is applied, even though it has
not been commanded
The aim of the report is to compare different formalisms as opposed to providing an ac-
curate representation of a realistic scenario. Thus, for simplicity, recovery from emer-
gency brake requests and failures is ignored in this study.
1http://www.deploy-project.eu/
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There are two types of events that can occur in this system. Those that occur in
time according to some average transition rate and those that occur instantaneously,
triggered by some other state change. An example of the former is the rate at which
the emergency brake is requested, events like this are most naturally modelled by the
exponential distribution. An example of an instantaneous transition is whether, after
an emergency brake request has occurred, the emergency brake is applied or it has an
unsafe failure. This type of event is most naturally modelled as a probabilistic choice
between the two options, occurring immediately after the state change triggering the
choice. Therefore, an intuitive model of this system should include state transitions
according to the exponential distribution as well as instantaneous state updates with
probabilistic choice.
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Figure 1: States and transitions for the EB system
Figure 1 shows the transitions that can occur in the emergency brake system con-
sidered. State 1 is the initial state in which the EB is not applied and has not been
commanded. From the initial state there are two possibilities. An emergency brake re-
quest can occur taking the system to state 2 where EB command is set – this modelled
according to the exponential distribution with rate λreq. State 2 is considered to be a
transient state from which one of two options will occur instantaneously. The first pos-
sible transition from state 2 is that of an unsafe failure (state 4), where the emergency
brake is not set – this occurs with some probability, punsafe. The other transition from
state 2 is a normal application of the emergency brake (state 5), i.e. EB applied is set
– this occurs with probability 1−punsafe. The final transition that should be mentioned
is the safe failure transition, which occurs from state 1 and takes the system to the safe
failure state (state 3) in which EB applied is set, but EB command is not. This transi-
tion is considered to occur according to the exponential distribution with rate λsafe.
There is a safety objective2 required of the system that “unsafe situation≤ λmax/hour”.
In this paper the safety objective is interpreted to mean that (on average) less than λmax
transitions into an unsafe situation occur per hour, where an unsafe situation is repre-
sented by an unsafe failure.
2according to railways standard documents such as EN50126, EN50128 and EN50129
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1.2 Approaches and Tools
Using the case study described above, two contrasting approaches to modelling stochas-
tic behaviour are explored. Namely: Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC) based
languages; and refinement calculus (proof-based) languages that have been extended
with probabilistic choice. These two approaches are introduced below.
1.2.1 CTMC Based
The CTMC based formalisms use standard Markov Chain analysis techniques and tend
to follow a model checking approach to show that a property holds in a given model.
The notion of allocating rewards to states or state transitions is often used to provide a
wider range of properties that can be analysed.
A CTMC consists of a set of states and a transition rate matrix (sometimes called
a Q-matrix). The transition rate matrix specifies for every state the rate at which tran-
sitions occur into every other state. Transition times follow the exponential probability
distribution (which has probability density function3 f (x) = λeλx, x≥ 0), using the val-
ues from the transition rate matrix as the parameter for this distribution. For example,
the value λij in the i
th row and jth column of the matrix states that transitions from state
i to state j occur according to the exponential distribution with a (rate) parameter of λij.
A number of properties of a system can be analysed from a CTMC. Some of these
are simply based on the steady state probability distribution – as time approaches in-
finity a Markov Chain may enter a steady state, i.e. the probability of observing the
system in each of its possible states remains constant. Others also rely on rewards –
a value is assigned to each state and/or state transition and the expected value of the
reward is calculated.
Kartson et. al [10] give examples of properties that can be analysed for CTMCs,
e.g.:
1. The probability of being in a given state – the steady state probability of being in
a given state
2. The average sojourn time in a given state – the average time spent in a state some
until transition occurs
3. The probability that some property holds – a reward of one is allocated to every
state in which the property holds, zero otherwise (and the expected value of the
reward is found)
4. The mean frequency at which a transition into a given state occurs – for every
state in which a transition into the given state is enabled, a reward is assigned
that is equal to the transition rate from that state
The above properties can be used to analyse various dependability properties. For
example, the average sojourn time could be used to determine the mean time between
failures in a situation where the current state is considered to be error-free and all
transitions from that state correspond to some failure transition.
There are many languages and tools that base their analysis on CTMCs. Some
examples include: PRISM [11]; Generalised Stochastic Petri Nets [10]; Stochastic
Activity Networks [15]; and PEPA [8]. These approaches tend to be petri net or process
3To determine the probability that a≤ x≤ b, the probability density function is integrated between these
values.
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algebra based and often use a model checking approach for analysis. The quality of
tool support varies widely between the different notations.
PRISM is chosen for further exploration, as an example of a CTMC based ap-
proach. The language is powerful enough for our needs, whilst being easy to follow,
and there is good tool support freely available for analysing models.
1.2.2 Proof-Based
The proof-based formalisms use the refinement calculus, extended to include proba-
bilistic choice [12], as their foundation. These notations use a theorem proving ap-
proach to show that certain probabilistic properties hold. Such proofs either use a re-
finement approach, or utilise probabilistic invariants (known as expectations) to prove
the properties of interest.
Proof-based approaches use a wide variety of syntax and different forms of logic,
but usually consist of the following basic components:
• variables which store the state of the system and are each declared to have some
type e.g. natural number or boolean
• some way to model state transitions, often called operations or events
• pre-conditions – define properties that must hold before a given state transition
takes place
• post-conditions – define properties that are guaranteed to hold after a given state
transition has taken place
• some notion of (boolean) properties that must always hold, often called invari-
ants
• refinement rules which state what properties must hold for a program (or speci-
fication) to be a valid implementation of a given specification
To model stochastic behaviour, a number of such formalisms have added a prob-
abilistic choice operator to the logic. This is usually written as p⊕, for example
x := 1 p⊕ x := 2. This example can be interpreted as x is assigned the value 1 with
probability p, and assigned the value 2 with probability 1− p. The rules of the logic
need to amended or added to in order to incorporate this extra behaviour.
When analysing the dependability (or other stochastic properties) of a model a for-
mal method two different approaches are taken. One of these involves creating an
abstract model of the system (that contains just the property of interest) and show-
ing that the more concrete model of the system is a valid refinement of the abstract
one. This raises the question as to what it means to refine a probabilistic model – this
is defined in a variety of different ways in the literature. The alternative option for
analysing the model is to use expectations. An expectation is real-valued expression
over the state, and has the requirement that the expected value of it is not decreased
by any operation (or event). For examples on how expectations can be used to model
dependability properties see Sections 3.3 and 4.3.
There are a number of different formalisms that have been extended with prob-
abilistic choice. These include: B (pB) [9]; Action Systems [16]; Hoare logic (pL)
[6]; Z [17]; and Event-B [7] (although only for the purposes of qualitative reasoning).
Some work has also been done on algebraic transformations of probabilistic specifica-
tions [13] to enable simpler reasoning.
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The most substantial contribution in this area is the probabilistic version of B (pB),
and as such this is the approach chosen for more detailed exploration.
2 Modelling in PRISM
The first modelling approach considered is that of Continuous Time Markov Chains.
The chosen modelling language and tool for this approach is PRISM [11]. This was
mainly chosen due to the excellent tool support that it provides and its ready availabil-
ity. PRISM also has extensive modelling checking facilities.
2.1 PRISM overview
PRISM is a probabilistic model checker that provides support for three different types
of probabilistic models:
• Discrete Time Markov Chains (DTMCs)
• Continuous Time Markov Chains (CTMCs)
• Markov Decision Processes (MDPs)
The CTMC modelling approach will be used for the emergency brake scenario, as it
uses the exponential distribution to model rates of transitions between states. A sum-
mary of the syntax of the CTMC models in PRISM4 is provided in Figure 2. Analysis
in PRISM is achieved by allocating rewards to states and state transitions, the syntax
for doing so is also included in Figure 2.
2.2 PRISM models and analysis
A first PRISM model consists of just one module in which all the behaviour was mod-
elled, Figure 3 shows the unsafe failure event. The full model can be found in Appendix
A.1. Realistically the subsystem for requesting the EB would be a separate subsystem
to that responsible for applying the EB, thus a second PRISM model was created in
which these behaviours were in separate modules. The request event (see Figure 4)
is synchronised over both the modules to link their behaviour. The full model can be
found in Appendix A.2. Both versions of the model are semantically equivalent. As
PRISM only allows numerical (and not algebraic) analysis, the parameters for the event
rates were given some suitable values for the purpose of analysis.
A safety analysis was carried out on both of the PRISM models described above.
A reward of 1 was allocated to the unsafe failure state (EB command∧¬EB applied),
with a reward of 0 being allocated elsewhere. This reward is cumulative, i.e. for every
time unit in which the model is in a unsafe state the reward is incremented by one.
PRISM can be used to analyse the expected value of the reward in steady state by
verifying the property R =?[S], which queries the value of the reward (R) in steady
state (S). Both versions of the model gave the same result in this analysis. For the
example being studied the value obtained on analysis of the above property can be
interpreted as the probability that the final state is unsafe. Note that (as recovery is
being ignored) the only state that is not absorbing is the initial state. This means that
the above analysis provides no information about the amount of time spent in the initial
4For more details (and to find about DTMCs and MDPs) see http://www.prismmodelchecker.org/
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A PRISM model consists of a set of constant declarations, one or more modules, and a
set of rewards.
Constants are declared as follows:
const type name = value;
Each module consists of a number of variable declarations and a number of
commands detailing the permitted state transitions.
Variable declarations have the following syntax:
name : type init init value;
Commands have the following syntax:
[action] guard -> rate : update;
A command is only enabled if the expression guard evaluates to true. The
rate determines (stochastically according to the exponential distribution) how much
time passes before an enabled event actually occurs. When an event occurs the state
transitions in update are implemented. Note that the rate clause is optional. If it is
left blank there must be another command in a separate module with the same action
with which this command is synchronised, i.e. when a command occurs in a module,
all commands with the same action label in other modules are also triggered.
Rewards are used to provide a range of analysis of a CTMC model, see Sec-
tion 1.2.1 for details. In PRISM, rewards have the following syntax:
rewards “label”
[action] guard : reward;
[action2] guard2 : reward2;
. . .
endrewards
The occurrence of a transition labelled action from an originating state satisfy-
ing the guard expression is awarded the stated reward. The action clause is optional
– if it is omitted, reward is acquired by being in a state that satisfies the guard
expression.
Figure 2: PRISM: Syntax for CTMC models
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[unsafe failure] commanded = false & applied = false ->
request rate * unsafe fail prob :
commanded’ = true;
Figure 3: First PRISM model - unsafe failure event
module EB request
. . .
[request] commanded = false & applied = false ->
request rate : commanded’ = true;
. . .
endmodule
module EB application
. . .
[request] true -> 1 - unsafe fail prob : applied’ = true +
unsafe fail prob : applied’ = false;
. . .
endmodule
Figure 4: Second PRISM model - synchronised request event
state (the probability of staying in the initial state forever is negligible and there is no
way of returning to it once it has been left). It is also possible to analyse the sojourn
time (see Section 1.2.1) in PRISM. However, for this case study such analysis would
only reveal the average time before any of the three possible events occur and thus
gives little insight into the safety of the system.
2.3 Experiences with PRISM
In this section the benefits and limitations of using the PRISM tool for modelling the
emergency brake scenario are considered.
The benefits of the PRISM tool are as follows:
• The ability to model the exponential distribution as well as probabilistic choice is
very useful. To model the emergency brake system without using the exponential
distribution (or a similar continuous probability distribution) leads to problems
on how to abstract the model (see Section 3.2).
• The PRISM tool has a good user interface and extensive tutorial material avail-
able free online.
• Modules are used to enable complex, but clearly structured models.
• Rewards structures allow separation of model and analysis.
The PRISM tool was found to have the following limitations:
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• Even for simple problems, all parameters needed initialisation – there is no way
to algebraically analyse the model. In the author’s opinion, this reduces the use-
fulness of this tool in the design phase where parameters often are not set, instead
it is important to determine the relationship between the different parameters of
the model and of the design requirements.
• With terminating states, the tool requires self loops back to such states – this is
not thought to be a very elegant solution.
Overall PRISM is a useful tool, but perhaps more useful in the later stages of the
software lifecycle when most parameters of the model will have known values.
3 Modelling in pB
The second modelling approach investigated uses a proof approach. A formal model is
created for the system of interest in a language that includes syntax and semantics for
handling probabilistic choice. Probabilistic properties of interest can be proved using
a method similar to that used for proving properties of non-probabilistic models.
Probabilistic B (pB) [9] as chosen as the modelling language for exploring this
approach. Probabilistic B is an interesting approach to explore as it includes expecta-
tions, which can be used to formalise probabilistic properties of interest. Probabilistic
proof rules can then be applied to prove the expectations. Probabilistic B also has tool
support, however the tool set transpires to be difficult to obtain.
3.1 pB overview
Probabilistic B is essentially standard classical B [1] extended to include the proba-
bilistic choice operator (p⊕), e.g. x := 1 p⊕ x := 2.
The semantics of pB is based on the probabilistic generalised substitution lan-
guage (pGSL) [14]. The semantics given are a probabilistic equivalent of weakest pre-
condition semantics, except that in pGSL the expected value of an expression is consid-
ered as probabilistic non-determinism is now included. Thus the usual pre⇒ [prog]post
(meaning that the final state is guaranteed to terminate in a state satisfying post if pre
held in the initial state) becomes preE ≡〉[prog]postE, which means that the expected
value of postE in the final state is at least the expected value of preE in the initial state.
A summary of pGSL is given in Figure 5; for a full description see [14].
In this study expectations are used to analyse safety properties in the pB models
of the emergency brake system. Expectations are essentially probabilistic versions of
invariants. For an invariant I, the initialisation would be expected to establish I and
all of the operations required to maintain I. An expectation, E, works in a similar way
except that it is an expression over the real numbers instead of the booleans. An initial
value, e, for E is also required when working with expectations, this can either be a
constant or some expression over the machine constants. The initial value e must be
established by the initialisation. The notion of establishing and maintaining an expec-
tation is slightly different from that of invariants due to the use of real numbers. It is
required that e≡〉[Init]E, i.e. that at least e is established by the initialisation operation,
and that E ≡〉[Op]E, i.e. that no operation can decrease the expected value of E. For
example consider a system that observes the number of heads (h) and tails occurring
when a tossing a fair coin n times. An expectation of the system may be 0 ≡〉h− n
2
,
meaning that heads account for at least half of the total number of observations. Note
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[x : = E]exp exp[E/x]
[x,y : = E,F]exp exp[E,F/x,y]
[pre | prog]exp 〈pre〉× [prog]exp, where 0×∞ =̂ 0
prog1[]prog2 [prog1]expmin[prog2]exp
[pre ⇒ prog]exp 1/〈pre〉× [prog]exp, where 0×∞ =̂ 0
[skip]exp exp
[prog1 p⊕prog2]exp p× [prog1]exp+(1−p)× [prog2]exp
[@y.pred ⇒ prog]exp (miny | pred.[prog]exp)
prog1 ⊑ prog2 [prog1]exp ≡〉[prog2]exp
• exp is an expectation
• pre is a predicate (not an expectation)
• 〈pre〉 denotes the predicate pre converted to an expectation, here restricted to the
interval: 〈false〉 is 0 and 〈true〉 is 1
• × is multiplication
• prog,prog1,prog2 are probabilistic generalised substitutions
• p is and expression over the program variables (possibly but not necessarily a
constant), taking value in [0,1]
• x is a variable
• y is a variable or vector of variables
• E is an expression
• F is an expression, or a vector of expressions
• exp1 ≡〉exp2 means that exp1 is everywhere no more than exp2
Figure 5: pGSL - the probabilistic generalised substitution language [14]
10
that a similar expectation about the number of tails observed would also be required to
ensure that the coin is fair.
3.2 Which abstraction?
The pB formalism [9] has no representation of time or continuous probability distri-
butions. Therefore to model the EB scenario in pB, first it is important to decide how
best to abstract away from time and transform the stochastic behaviour into discrete
probabilistic choice statements.
There are essentially two ways in which the probabilities can be calculated based
on the rate (CTMC) based description of the system and the choice between them
depends on what kind of question to be asked of the model. One question a system
designer may like to consider is which state transition is likely to occur first from a
given state – this scenario is described in Option 1. Alternatively, a designer may like
to know what could happen in the next time step (including the possibility of nothing),
or for how long the system is likely to remain in a state – this scenario is described in
Option 2. The limitations and benefits of both of these options are discussed in more
detail below.
Option 1: Embedded Markov Chain (What happens next?)
In this option the likelihood of each state transition is considered, with respect to
all possible state transitions from the current state. This is a simple and popular way
of abstracting a CTMC into discrete probabilistic choice. To do so, it is required to
calculate the Embedded Markov Chain, as follows:
pij =


λij
∑
k 6=i
λik
i 6= j
0 otherwise
(1)
where
• pij is the probability that the transition from state i to state j occurs
• λij is the rate at which transitions from state i to state j occur in the CTMC
(similarly for λik)
pij is calculated for all possible state transitions to produce a DTMC, which can be
modelled with multiple probabilistic choice statements in pB.
Whilst this is a straightforward approach for calculating probabilities for use with
pB, it is not without consequences. With a model like this all sense of how long is
spent in each state is lost, and in fact for the EB scenario all that can be determined
from this model is the probability of the system ending up in each of the terminating
states. When interested in dependability data such as the mean time between failures
this abstraction is clearly not very useful.
Option 2: Single time unit transitions (What happens in the next time unit?)
In the second option the question of interest is: what could happen within some
small amount of time, t? To do so, the probability of each possible transition occurring
within such time is calculated. The time period t is considered to be short enough to
allow the possibility of no change happening with t. To model this a new (self-looping)
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transition needs to be created with a probability equal to 1−the sum of the probabilities
of all the other possible transitions from that state.
Unfortunately, calculating the probabilities for this approach is far from straight-
forward, especially for large, complex systems. The calculation is further complicated
in a system where chains of several transitions can occur within t.
The emergency brake system is a high level description and does not have chains
of transitions to consider, making it possible to obtain the required probabilities as
follows:
pij =


λij
∑
∀k
λik

1− e
−∑
∀k
λikt

 i 6= j
λii
∑
∀k
λik

1− e
−∑
∀k
λikt

+ e
−∑
∀k
λikt
otherwise
(2)
where
• pij is the probability that the transition from state i to state j occurs
• λij is the rate at which transitions from state i to state j occur in the CTMC
(similarly for λik)
pij is calculated for all possible state transitions to produce a DTMC, which can be
modelled with multiple probabilistic choice statements in pB.
It is outside of the scope of this paper to find a way of calculating such probabilities
for the general case, as this is a complex problem in itself.
This approach allows for more powerful reasoning about the system and would
make it possible to determine dependability measures such as the mean time between
failures. However, the required calculations are far from straightforward in the general
case and if it is desired to reason about probabilistic properties of the obtained model
these would need to be transformed appropriately before and after analysis as well.
3.3 pB models and analysis
Separate models were created in pB for the emergency brake scenario for each of the
abstraction options given in Section 3.2. In this section an overview of the models is
provided and the analysis of the safety property (given in Section 1.1) is shown. Full
descriptions of the pB models can be found in Appendix B, the proofs for the safety
property can be found in full in Appendix C.
Both of the pB models include separate operations that represent the safe and
unsafe failure situations as well as the intended operation of the emergency brake
(EB Normal). To provide a clear structure for the model (and also to separate the
stochastic behaviour from the deterministic, or logical, behaviour), the above opera-
tions only describe the deterministic behaviour of the emergency brake in each of these
situations. There are additional operations in the models for describing the stochastic
behaviour of the model, EB Request and main, which call the other operations to com-
bine the deterministic and stochastic behaviour. The intended behaviour of the system
as a whole (stochastic or otherwise) is captured in the main operation, and as such this
is the operation that the analysis is performed on. The main and EB Request events for
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option 1 are shown in Figure 6. The model for option two also has a tick operation to
model the passing of time (see Figure 7).
main =̂
PRE
EB command = false ∧ EB applied = false
THEN
PCHOICE p safe OF
safe Failure()
OR
EB Request()
END
END
EB Request =̂
PRE
EB command = false ∧ EB applied = false
THEN
PCHOICE p us OF
unsafe Failure()
OR
EB Normal()
END
END;
Figure 6: pB main and EB Request operations for option 1
A safety analysis was carried out on both of the pB models. The safety property was
modelled using probabilistic invariants called expectations. However, the formulation
and analysis of such expectations requires access to historical data about the stochastic
behaviour to provide useful analysis. Thus fresh variables are required in the model to
record: the number of times the model has been exercised; and of these times the num-
ber of occurrences of the property of interest. This is similar to the rewards approach
of CTMCs, however in pB these fresh variables have to be integrated into the model.
For option 1 fresh variables n and c were added: n records the number of times
the model has been exercised (i.e. is incremented every time main is called); and
c records the number of unsafe failure occurrences (i.e. is incremented every time
Unsafe Failure is called). Once these variables have been included in the model, the
expectation can be added and analysed. The number of unsafe failures is required to
be bounded above by some given value. The following expectation should be analysed
to test this requirement:
0 ≡〉 n×p max− c (3)
This is interpreted as n× p max− c is always at least 0, i.e. that c
n
is always at most
some maximum p max. Analysis of the above expectation shows how the stochastic
parameters (e.g. p safe for the probability of a safe failure – see Appendix B) relate to
each other and the required maximum probability of unsafe failure, p max in order to
respect the expectation. The result (see Appendix C for the full proof) obtained is:
(1−p safe)×p us ≤ p max (4)
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main =̂
PRE
EB command = false ∧ EB applied = false
THEN
PCHOICE p safe OF
safe Failure()
OR
PCHOICE p req OF
EB Request()
OR
skip
END
END
|| tick()
END
EB Request =̂
PRE
EB command = false ∧ EB applied = false
THEN
PCHOICE p us OF
unsafe Failure()
OR
EB Normal()
END
END;
Figure 7: pB main and EB Request operations for option 2
For option 2 fresh variables time and c were added: time records the number of time
units that have passed (i.e. is incremented every time main is called); and c records the
number of unsafe failure occurrences (i.e. is incremented every time Unsafe Failure is
called). Once these variables have been included in the model, the expectation can be
added and analysed. The number of unsafe failures is required to be bounded above by
some given value. The following expectation should be analysed to test this require-
ment:
0 ≡〉 time×p max− c (5)
This is interpreted as time× p max− c is always at least 0, i.e. that the “rate” c
time
is always at most some maximum p max. Analysis of the above expectation shows
how the stochastic parameters (e.g. p safe for the probability of a safe failure – see
Appendix B) relate to each other and the required maximum probability of unsafe
failure, p max in order to respect the expectation. The result (see Appendix C for the
full proof) obtained is:
(1−p safe)×p req×p us ≤ p max (6)
Note that the result is given in terms of probabilities of events occurring within one time
unit, as opposed to the rate parameters of the original CTMC. To get back to the rates it
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is required to substitute the pij’s according to the equations given in Section 3.2 and re-
arrange/simplify the resulting inequality. This is not a straightforward task, especially
for more complex systems, therefore this solution is far from ideal.
3.4 Experiences with pB
In this section the benefits and limitations of using probabilistic B for modelling the
emergency brake scenario are considered.
The benefits of pB were found to be as follows:
• Can obtain algebraic solutions from the analysis of expectations – this allows the
designer to determine the relationship between the different parameters of the
model and of the design requirements. Thus the designer gains a better under-
standing of the system, and can carry out the design job more effectively.
The following limitations were uncovered whilst using pB:
• Converting rates to probabilistic choice is not trivial – as is illustrated above
it is not simple to model and analyse a system that is naturally described as a
CTMC in a modelling language that only supports discrete probabilistic choice.
Attempts to do this either lead to loss of information or create complex models
that are hard to relate back to the original problem, particularly if chains of events
can occur within a single time unit.
• Tool support is not freely available – therefore this approach can only be used
with the time and confidence to perform the proofs by hand or sufficient funds
for the licence fee.
• Use of fresh variables in the model is not ideal – instead it would be better to be
able to separate analysis from model e.g. using a rewards-like system – this may
well be a feasible extension to the pB notation.
• Probabilistic choice clauses are restricted to two options – whilst this does not
limit how many options can be modelled as probabilistic choice statements can
be nested, it does lead to messier models – again this could be a feasible exten-
sion to the pB notation.
Overall probabilistic B is an interesting approach to modelling and analysing stochas-
tic behaviour. In particular the ability to obtain algebraic solutions is very powerful and
potentially very useful for designers. However, the lack of support for continuous prob-
ability distributions does limit its applicability somewhat as it is not really feasible for
modelling systems that are naturally described using such distributions.
4 Modelling in Stochastic Event-B
Based on our experiences of modelling the emergency brake scenario in PRISM and
pB, a third possibility is now explored – that of extending the formal language Event-B
[2] with appropriate syntax and semantics for the analysis of stochastic behaviour. The
proposed approach is similar to that of probabilistic B, but also with the inclusion of
the exponential distribution for modelling continuous time behaviour. The method of
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expectation analysis is used to prove probabilistic properties of interest for the emer-
gency brake scenario. A key advantage that Event-B has over B is the Rodin platform5,
an open source toolkit that supports the language with various features – including au-
tomated and interactive provers. Event-B also seems to be a more natural language for
modelling the rate of occurrence of failures, by modelling these as events.
An overview of “standard” Event B is given, before describing the proposed stochas-
tic extensions. The extensions are illustrated using the emergency brake scenario and
comparisons to the existing approaches are provided.
4.1 Event-B overview
The Event-B formalism is derived from classical B [1], but also incorporates concepts
from Action Systems [4]. The semantics of an Event-B model is given as a set of proof
obligations. Reasoning in Event-B is based on demonic non-determinism.
An Event-B model consists of two types of components: Machines and Contexts.
A Machine models the dynamic behaviour of the system such as the variables and the
events. The Context provides details of the static information – constant identifiers,
values and properties over such values.
The Machine description contains the bulk of the model and may include variables,
invariants and events. Variables store the state of the machine. Invariants are used to
constrain the types of the variables as well as state other logical properties over the
variables that must hold at all times. Events define the behaviour of the system, i.e.
the state transitions that may occur. Each event may include a guard, which defines
the states from which the transition can occur, and will include a set actions which
define the updates to the variables. For more detailed information about the contents
of Event-B models the reader is referred to Abrial’s forthcoming book [2].
A number of proof obligations are automatically generated for an Event-B model.
These proof obligations state the requirements for the model to be internally consistent.
For example, events must not invalidate the invariants (known as invariant preserva-
tion), the proof obligation that states this is as follows:
I(v)
G(t,v)
S(t,v,v′)
⊢
I(v′)
(7)
• v represents the variables of the Machine before the event has occurred
• v′ represents the variables of the Machine after the event has occurred
• t represents the parameters of the event
• I(v) states the invariants hold for the assignment of variables v
• G(t,v) states the guard of the event holds for the assignment of variables v and
parameters t
• S(t,v,v′) represents the state transition modelled in the actions of the event
For further details on the proof obligations generated from an Event-B model see
Abrial’s forthcoming book [2].
5http://www.event-b.org/platform.html
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4.2 Stochastic extensions
As with classical B, standard reasoning in Event-B is based on demonic nondeter-
minism. Such reasoning is not sufficient for analysing quantitative properties such as
reliability and safety. Therefore some extensions to standard Event-B are proposed to
support stochastic reasoning for the analysis of such properties.
There has already been a little research on how to add probabilistic choice to Event-
B [7]. However, that research focuses on qualitative probabilistic reasoning; it is not
possible to analyse numerical properties such as the emergency brake’s safety require-
ment using such techniques. To reason about the safety requirement, quantitative rea-
soning is essential. Therefore it is proposed to extend Event-B actions with the proba-
bilistic choice operator, i.e. to include statements such as x := 1 p⊕ x := 2.
The ability to model continuous probability distributions is also of importance,
in particular the exponential distribution for timing of events. In order to do this it is
proposed that an event may have an associated rate parameter, which represents the rate
of the occurrence of the event with respect to the exponential probability distribution.
For some analysis a designer may be interested in the amount of time that has
passed as well as the rate of occurrence of events. Therefore it is also proposed to ex-
tend Event-B actions to include an operator for assigning a value to a variable from a
continuous probability distribution. For example, an action of time : = time + exp(λ)
would increment time by a randomly assigned observation from the exponential distri-
bution with parameter λ.
For analysis of stochastic properties, such as the safety property in the emergency
brake scenario, the use of expectations as in pB (see Section 3.1) is advocated. There-
fore, an expectations clause will be added to Event-B Machines to model these. The
semantics of such statements would be very similar to that of expectations in classical
B, except that Event-B has events that would have to respect the expectations instead
of B’s operations.
4.3 Event-B models and analysis
This section summarises how Event-B was used to model and analyse the case study.
Three different models of the emergency brake are discussed. In a first model the
limitations of analysing the scenario in standard Event-B (i.e. without any stochas-
tic extensions) are demonstrated. Afterwards, two different options for analysing the
stochastic behaviour of the emergency brake are explored. In option one time is mod-
elled implicitly using a rate parameter. Option two makes use of the statement time :=
time + exp(λ) to update time explicitly. Note that these two options for modelling
stochastic behaviour are semantically equivalent (and as will be seen give the same
result on analysis of the expectation). The main differences are in the event and ex-
pectation notations, and the amount of flexibility each option provides, these issues are
discussed towards the end of this section. Full descriptions of all the Event-B models
can be found in Appendix D.
In standard Event-B the closest approximation to the emergency brake scenario in-
volves a non-deterministic choice between the possible events: EB Normal, Safe Failure
and Unsafe Failure. There is no way of stating how often each of these events occur.
Similarly, the best approach available for including the safety property is to model it
as an invariant EB command = TRUE ⇒ EB applied = TRUE. It is clear to see that
the Unsafe Failure event violates this invariant as it sets EB command to TRUE, but
EB applied remains FALSE. Therefore, it can be concluded from the standard Event-B
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Event EB Request =̂
when
grd1 : EB applied = FALSE∧EB command = FALSE
then
rate : λreq
act1 : (EB command,c,n := TRUE,c+1,n+1) p⊕
(EB applied,EB command,n := TRUE,TRUE,n+1)
end
Figure 8: Stochastic Event-B EB Request event for option 1
Event EB Request =̂
when
grd1 : EB applied = FALSE∧EB command = FALSE
then
rate : λreq
act1 : (EB command,c := TRUE,c+1) p⊕
(EB applied,EB command := TRUE,TRUE)
act2 : time := time+ exp(λreq)
end
Figure 9: Stochastic Event-B EB Request event for option 2
model that the safety property is not preserved by the Unsafe Failure event. However,
it is not possible to build an implementation of the emergency brake system in which
it can be guaranteed 100% that an unsafe failure will never occur. Thus stochastic
modelling is needed to establish and minimise the chances of an unsafe situation (and
guarantee the stochastic version of the safety property).
For the stochastic Event-B models of the emergency brake, the standard model
above is used as a basis and the EB Normal and Unsafe Failure events are combined
into a single EB Request event. This event includes a probabilistic choice statement
that results in either the unsafe failure situation (with probability p) or the normal ap-
plication of the emergency brake. Both the EB Request event and the Safe Failure
event are assigned a rate value (λreq and λsafe respectively). These rate values are
taken to be parameters of the exponential distribution parameter and model the rate at
which the events occur. Note that this representation of the emergency brake scenario
is analogous to the natural way of modelling the system, described in Section 1.1.
For the first stochastic Event-B model considered (option 1), time is treated implic-
itly through the use of the rate parameter (see Figure 8). Similarly to the pB models,
fresh variables are required for analysis, to track the history of the probabilistic choice
statement. The total number of times the probabilistic choice is exercised is represented
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by n, and the number of times it resulted in an unsafe failure by c. The safety property
is translated into the following expectation to be analysed:
0 ≡〉 n×λmax− c×λreq (8)
This is interpreted as n× λmax − c× λreq is always at least 0, i.e. that
c
n
× λreq (the
frequency of unsafe failures) always occurs at some maximum rate λmax. The above
expectation is analysed on the event of interest (EB Request) to provide a relationship
between the parameters of the model and the safety property. The following inequality
is obtained as a result:
p×λreq ≤ λmax (9)
Full details of the expectation analysis can be found in Appendix E.1. Note that the
expectation analysis for the Safe Failure event is omitted, but is satisfied trivially as the
event does not update any of the variables included in the expectation.
In the second stochastic Event-B model considered (option 2), time is treated ex-
plicitly in event actions (as described above) that update time according to the expo-
nential distribution (see Figure 9). A fresh variable is still required for analysis, but
this time only c (the number of unsafe failures) is needed as time is being recorded ex-
plicitly. The safety property is translated into the following expectation to be analysed:
0 ≡〉 time×λmax− c (10)
This is read as time×λmax−c is always at least 0, i.e. that
c
time
(the frequency of unsafe
failures) always occurs at some maximum rate λmax. As before, the above expectation
is analysed on the event of interest (EB Request) to provide a relationship between the
parameters of the model and the safety property. The following inequality is obtained
as a result:
p×λreq ≤ λmax (11)
Full details of the expectation analysis can be found in Appendix E.1. Note that the
expectation analysis for the Safe Failure event is omitted, but is satisfied trivially as
this event only increments time (not c) and therefore never decreases the value of the
expectation. This second approach to modelling the stochastic behaviour in Event-B
requires additional syntax and semantics to be defined. However, as can be seen from
above, it results in a cleaner formulation of the expectation. The explicit approach
could also be used in other situations, for example the error of some measurement may
follow a normal distribution.
Note that the two options for modelling stochastic behaviour in Event-B are se-
mantically equivalent and as such give the same result on analysis of the expectation.
The main differences are in the event and expectation notations, and the amount of
flexibility each option provides as discussed briefly above.
4.4 Experiences with Stochastic Event-B
In this section we reflect on the use of stochastic Event-B for modelling dependable sys-
tems, particularly in comparison to the existing approaches described in Section 1.1.2.
Both options for stochastic Event-B, illustrated by the emergency brake case study
above, provide a clean and useful method for combining stochastic and logical rea-
soning. The use of rates and the exponential distribution allow an intuitive model of
the case study, where-as using probabilistic choice alone (as with pB) is rather more
complicated. As a consequence the stochastic Event-B models are smaller than those
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possible in pB, with fewer proof steps required to analyse the expectations. With a sim-
pler notation and shorter proofs, more complex problems should be easier to analyse.
Finally, using the expectation approach allows an algebraic analysis of the model. Al-
gebraic solutions reveal the precise relationship between parameters of the model and
the stochastic requirements, thus making the impact of design decisions more transpar-
ent.
Some valuable lessons were also learnt whilst analysing the emergency brake sce-
nario in the proposed stochastic version of Event-B. Interestingly, it would seem that
the way an expectation is formulated has an impact on the algebraic solution obtained.
For example, for option 1, an alternative (semantically equivalent) expectation was ini-
tially analysed, 0≡〉 λmax−
c
n
×λreq, and gave the result p≤
c
n
. Whilst the two solutions
are not contradictory (different variables of the model are referred to in each), the so-
lution presented in Section 4.3 is clearly more useful for finding a suitable design for
the system. Therefore the way in which expectations are formulated seems to impact
on the usefulness of the results obtained.
Option 2 should also be used with some caution, as a couple of subtle issues were
noticed when analysing/implementing such a model. There are rounding issues to
consider when obtaining an observation from a continuous probability distribution, i.e.
when implementing a statement such as time := time+ exp(λ). Also the statement
(x := 1 p⊕ x := 2) || time := time+ exp(λ)
would not be equivalent to
(x := 1 || time := time+ exp(λ)) p⊕ (x := 2 || time := time+ exp(λ))
in general. This parallel substitution rule is valid for probabilistic programs. However,
if there is a stochastic assignment on the right-hand side of || there needs to be some
constraint in place to prevent different values being allocated to each instance of the
stochastic assignment in the resulting statement. Note that this is not an issue if the
analysis only depends on the expected value of the observation.
Overall, stochastic Event-B looks like a promising approach to modelling and
analysing stochastic systems. Some suggested steps to improve this approach further
are discussed in the next section.
5 Further Work
The proposed extensions to Event-B for stochastic behaviour are still very early ideas
– there are many ways in which this work can be improved and extended. Some of the
opportunities for further work are discussed below.
The reported extensions to Event-B for stochastic reasoning were essentially a fea-
sibility study, therefore the only proof obligation considered was that of expectation
preservation. In order for the stochastic extensions to be fully integrated into Event-B,
further investigation is required to determine fully which proof obligations need to be
added or amended. In particular those on refinement, as refining stochastic behaviour
is an interesting problem.
An intriguing problem with adding probabilistic choice to a modelling language
such as B, is that of the interaction between demonic and probabilistic choice. This
issue is discussed for pB in [9]. The author is interested in exploring how demonic
choice would interact with continuous probability distributions. What results would
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be obtained if the model had some events occurring according to the exponential dis-
tribution, as well as some events that can occur at any time (controlled by an external
(demonic) entity)?
Another possible extension to the proposed approach would be to include other
probability distributions, for example the Normal distribution could be useful for mod-
elling measurement errors. Reward structures would also be useful for identifying the
costs and benefits of specific states, thus eliminating the need for messy fresh variables.
Comprehensive tool support encourages industrial uptake of new methods; there-
fore an important extension to this work would involve developing a plug-in to the
Rodin platform that enables modelling and analysis of stochastic Event-B models.
Finally, more complex case studies would allow further investigation into this promis-
ing approach and could lead to more interesting problems to explore.
6 Conclusions
The need for providing quantitative probabilistic modelling has been demonstrated and
existing approaches for doing so explored. The case study highlighted the benefits of
the two languages examined in detail: PRISM and pB. However, it also exposed a
number of limitations in each. Based on these experiences a new approach has been
proposed that aims to address some of the limitations. This approach looks promis-
ing, but needs further work as outlined in the previous section. The main findings are
summarised below.
The CTMC based approach benefits from: a good range of tools to support mod-
elling and analysis of properties; and the possibility to incorporate both continuous
probability distributions and probabilistic choice. However, this approach is aimed at
the analysis of systems, not design, so algebraic solutions to a design problem may be
impossible to find. The CTMC approach also often suffers from state space explosion
problems making it costly (in terms of time and memory usage) to model anything too
complex.
The proof-based approach has the benefit of being able to obtain algebraic solu-
tions, making design decisions clearer. However, there is currently no way to model
or reason about continuous probability distributions with this approach, which makes
it hard to model systems that naturally follow continuous distributions without losing
a significant amount of information about their behaviour. Tool support is also very
limited for this approach.
The proposed approach of a “stochastic Event-B” builds on the benefits of the
proof-based approach, but extends this approach to include continuous probability dis-
tributions (in particular the exponential distribution). Applying this approach to the
case study gave promising results.
Whilst there are still many issues that need to be addressed, the proposed approach
potentially has a lot to offer a designer of dependable systems.
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A PRISM Models
A.1 Version 1
// First attempt at making a PRISM model of the emergency brake scenario
// Author: Zoe Andrews
// Version: 0.0 (18 July 2008)
ctmc
// Parameters:
// The brake is requested this many times per hour
const double request rate = 0.1;
// The brake fails in a safe way (eb applied not commanded) this many times per hour
const double safe fail rate = 0.001;
// The probability that the brake fails in an unsafe way (commanded, not applied)
const double unsafe fail prob = 0.01;
module EB
// State variables
commanded : bool init false; // Whether the EB has been requested or not
applied : bool init false; // Whether the EB is applied or not
// A successful request for the EB
[request success] commanded=false & applied=false -> request rate*(1-unsafe fail prob) : com-
manded’=true & applied’=true;
// An unsuccessful request for the EB (ie an unsafe failure)
[unsafe failure] commanded=false & applied=false -> request rate*unsafe fail prob : commanded’=true;
// A safe failure occurs, ie the emergency brake is applied without a command
[safe failure] commanded=false & applied=false -> safe fail rate : applied’=true;
endmodule
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// Reward structures
rewards “unsafe failures”
commanded=true & applied=false : 1;
endrewards
A.2 Version 2
// Second attempt at making a PRISM model of the emergency brake scenario
// Author: Zoe Andrews
// Version: 0.1 (4th December 2008)
ctmc
// Parameters:
// The brake is requested this many times per hour
const double request rate = 0.1;
// The brake fails in a safe way (eb applied not commanded) this many times per hour
const double safe fail rate = 0.001;
// The probability that the brake fails in an unsafe way (commanded, not applied)
const double unsafe fail prob = 0.01;
module EB request
// State variables
commanded : bool init false; // Whether the EB has been requested or not
// Synchronises with the request action in the EB application module
// Models the act of requesting the EB
[request] commanded=false & applied=false -> request rate : commanded’=true;
endmodule
module EB application
// State variables
applied : bool init false; // Whether the EB is applied or not
// A safe failure occurs, ie the emergency brake is applied without a command
[safe failure] commanded=false & applied=false -> safe fail rate : applied’=true;
// Synchronises with the request action in the EB request module
// Once a request has occurred the EB is applied with probability
// 1 - the unsafe failure probability (and remains false with prob unsafe fail prob)
[request] true -> 1 - unsafe fail prob : applied’=true + unsafe fail prob :
applied’=false;
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endmodule
// Reward structures
rewards “unsafe failures”
commanded=true & applied=false : 1;
endrewards
B pB Models
B.1 Option 1
// Version 1 based on embedded markov chain approach
// (What happens next?)
MACHINE EmergencyBrakeV1 ()
CONSTANTS
p us, p safe
PROPERTIES
p us ∈ REAL ∧ p safe ∈ REAL
VARIABLES
EB command, EB applied, c, n
INVARIANT
EB command ∈ BOOL ∧ EB applied ∈ BOOL ∧
c ∈  ∧ n ∈  
EXPECTATIONS
real(0) ≡〉 real(n) × p max − real(c)
INITIALISATION
EB command : = false || EB applied : = false ||
c : = 0 || n : = 0
OPERATIONS
EB Request =̂
PRE
EB command = false ∧ EB applied = false
THEN
PCHOICE p us OF
unsafe Failure()
OR
EB Normal()
END
END;
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EB Normal =̂
PRE
EB command = false ∧ EB applied = false
THEN
EB command : = true || EB applied : = true
END;
safe Failure =̂
PRE
EB command = false ∧ EB applied = false
THEN
EB applied : = true || c : = 0
END;
unsafe Failure =̂
PRE
EB command = false ∧ EB applied = false
THEN
EB command : = true
END;
main =̂
PRE
EB command = false ∧ EB applied = false
THEN
PCHOICE p safe OF
safe Failure()
OR
EB Request()
END
END
END
B.2 Option 2
// Version 2 based on "tick" approach
// (What happens in the next time unit?)
MACHINE EmergencyBrakeV2 ()
CONSTANTS
p us, p safe, p req
PROPERTIES
p us ∈ REAL ∧ p safe ∈ REAL ∧ p req ∈ REAL
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VARIABLES
EB command, EB applied, c, time
INVARIANT
EB command ∈ BOOL ∧ EB applied ∈ BOOL ∧
c ∈  ∧ time ∈  
EXPECTATIONS
real(0) ≡〉 real(time) × p max − real(c)
INITIALISATION
EB command : = false || EB applied : = false ||
c : = 0 || time : = 0
OPERATIONS
EB Request =̂
PRE
EB command = false ∧ EB applied = false
THEN
PCHOICE p us OF
unsafe Failure()
OR
EB Normal()
END
END;
EB Normal =̂
PRE
EB command = false ∧ EB applied = false
THEN
EB command : = true || EB applied : = true
END;
safe Failure =̂
PRE
EB command = false ∧ EB applied = false
THEN
EB applied : = true
END;
unsafe Failure =̂
PRE
EB command = false ∧ EB applied = false
THEN
EB command : = true
END;
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tick =̂
BEGIN
time : = time + 1
END;
main =̂
PRE
EB command = false ∧ EB applied = false
THEN
PCHOICE p safe OF
safe Failure()
OR
PCHOICE p req OF
EB Request()
OR
skip
END
END
|| tick()
END
END
C pB Expectation Analysis
C.1 Option 1
In this section the proof of the following probabilistic invariant is given:
E =̂ n×p max− c (12)
First it is shown that the initialisation maintains the invariant. This involves proving
the following:
0 ≡〉 [Initialisation]E (13)
Consider the right hand side of the inequality:
[Initialisation]E
≡ definition of Initialisation
[EB command,EB applied,c,n : = false, false,0,0]E
≡ definition of E
[EB command,EB applied,c,n : = false, false,0,0] (n×p max− c)
≡ 0×p max−0 simple substitutions
≡ 0 arithmetic
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Thus the initialisation procedure establishes the initial lower bound of the expecta-
tion.
Next it is proved that the main method maintains the expectation, i.e. that:
E ≡〉 [main]E (14)
Again consider the right hand side of this inequality:
[main]E
≡ definition of main

(
safe Failure() p safe⊕EB Request ()
)
||
n : = n+1

E
≡ definition of EB Request


 safe Failure()
p safe⊕
(unsafe Failure() p us⊕EB Normal())


||
n : = n+1

E
≡ definition of safe Failure, unsafe Failure, EB Normal and E



EB applied : = true
p safe⊕
 EB command,c : = true,c+1
p us⊕
EB command,EB applied : = true, true




||
n : = n+1


(n×p max− c)
≡ parallel substitution with p safe⊕


 EB applied : = true||
n : = n+1


p safe⊕


 EB command,c : = true,c+1
p us⊕
EB command,EB applied : = true, true


||
n : = n+1




(n×p max− c)
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≡ probabilistic choice substitution p safe⊕
p safe ×
 EB applied : = true||
n : = n+1

 (n×p max− c)
+(1−p safe) ×


 EB command,c : = true,c+1
p us⊕
EB command,EB applied : = true, true


||
n : = n+1

 (n×p max− c)
≡ parallel substitution with p us⊕
p safe ×
 EB applied : = true||
n : = n+1

 (n×p max− c)
+(1−p safe) ×


 EB command,c : = true,c+1||
n : = n+1


p us⊕
 EB command,EB applied : = true, true||
n : = n+1




(n×p max− c)
≡ probabilistic choice substitution p us⊕
p safe ×
 EB applied : = true||
n : = n+1

(n×p max− c)
+(1−p safe)×

p us ×
 EB command,c : = true,c+1||
n : = n+1

(n×p max− c)
+(1−p us)×
 EB command,EB applied : = true, true||
n : = n+1

(n×p max− c)


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≡ parallel substitution and simple substitution
p safe × ((n+1)×p max− c)
+ (1−p safe)×
(
p us × ((n+1)×p max− (c+1))
+ (1−p us)× ((n+1)×p max− c)
)
To maintain the expectation it is required that E ≤ [main]E, thus (from the above
substitutions) that:
(n×p max− c) ≤ p safe × ((n+1)×p max− c)
+ (1−p safe)×(
p us × ((n+1)×p max− (c+1))
+ (1−p us)× ((n+1)×p max− c)
)
≡ arithmetic
(1−p safe)×p us ≤ p max
C.2 Option 2
In this section the proof of the following probabilistic invariant is given:
E =̂ time×p max− c (15)
First it is shown that the initialisation maintains the invariant. To do this it is proved
that:
0 ≡〉 [Initialisation]E (16)
Consider the right hand side of the inequality:
[Initialisation]E
≡ definition of Initialisation
[EB command,EB applied,c, time : = false, false,0,0]E
≡ definition of E
[EB command,EB applied,c, time : = false, false,0,0] (time×p max− c)
≡ 0×p max−0 simple substitutions
≡ 0 arithmetic
Thus it has been shown that the initialisation procedure establishes the initial lower
bound of the expectation.
Next it is required to show that the main method maintains the expectation, i.e. that:
E ≡〉 [main]E (17)
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Again consider the right hand side of this inequality:
[main]E
≡ definition of main

(
safe Failure() p safe⊕ (EB Request () p req⊕ skip)
)
||
tick ()

E
≡ definition of EB Request and tick


 safe Failure()
p safe⊕
((unsafe Failure() p us⊕EB Normal()) p req⊕ skip)


||
time : = time+1

E
≡ definition of safe Failure, unsafe Failure, EB Normal and E



EB applied : = true
p safe⊕


 EB command,c : = true,c+1
p us⊕
EB command,EB applied : = true, true


p req⊕
skip




||
time : = time+1


(time×p max− c)
≡ parallel substitution with p safe⊕


 EB applied : = true||
time : = time+1


p safe⊕




 EB command,c : = true,c+1
p us⊕
EB command,EB applied : = true, true


p req⊕
skip


||
time : = time+1




(time×p max− c)
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≡ probabilistic choice substitution p safe⊕
p safe ×
 EB applied : = true||
time : = time+1

 (time×p max− c)
+(1−p safe) ×




 EB command,c : = true,c+1
p us⊕
EB command,EB applied : = true, true


p req⊕
skip


||
time : = time+1


(time×p max− c)
≡ parallel substitution with p req⊕
p safe ×
 EB applied : = true||
time : = time+1

 (time×p max− c)
+(1−p safe) ×




 EB command,c : = true,c+1
p us⊕
EB command,EB applied : = true, true


||
time : = time+1


p req⊕
 skip||
time : = time+1




(time×p max− c)
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≡ probabilistic choice substitution p req⊕
p safe ×
 EB applied : = true||
time : = time+1

(time×p max− c)
+(1−p safe)×

p req ×


 EB command,c : = true,c+1
p us⊕
EB command,EB applied : = true, true


||
time : = time+1

(time×p max− c)
+(1−p req)×
 skip||
time : = time+1

(time×p max− c)


≡ parallel substitution with p us⊕
p safe ×
 EB applied : = true||
time : = time+1

(time×p max− c)
+(1−p safe)×

p req ×


 EB command,c : = true,c+1||
time : = time+1


p us⊕
 EB command,EB applied : = true, true||
time : = time+1




(time×p max− c)
+(1−p req)×
 skip||
time : = time+1

(time×p max− c)


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≡ probabilistic choice substitution p us⊕
p safe ×
 EB applied : = true||
time : = time+1

(time×p max− c)
+(1−p safe)×

p req ×

p us ×
 EB command,c : = true,c+1||
time : = time+1

(time×p max− c)
+(1−p us)×
 EB command,EB applied : = true, true||
time : = time+1

(time×p max− c)


+(1−p req)×
 skip||
time : = time+1

(time×p max− c)


≡ parallel substitution and simple substitution
p safe ×
((time+1)×p max− c)
+(1−p safe)×

p req ×(
p us × ((time+1)×p max− (c+1))
+ (1−p us) × ((time+1)×p max− c)
)
+(1−p req)×
((time+1)×p max− c)


To maintain the expectation it is required that E ≤ [main]E, thus (from the above
substitutions) that:
(time×p max− c) ≤ p safe × ((time+1)×p max− c)
+(1−p safe)×

p req ×

p us×
((time+1)×p max− (c+1))
+(1−p us)×
((time+1)×p max− c)


+(1−p req)×
((time+1)×p max− c)


≡ arithmetic
(1−p safe)×p req×p us ≤ p max
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D Event B Models
D.1 Standard Event B
MACHINE EB
VARIABLES
EB applied
EB command
INVARIANTS
inv1 : EB applied ∈ BOOL
inv2 : EB command ∈ BOOL
inv3 : EB command = TRUE ⇒ EB applied = TRUE
EVENTS
Initialisation
begin
act1 : EB applied := FALSE
act2 : EB command := FALSE
end
Event Unsafe Failure =̂
when
grd1 : EB applied = FALSE∧EB command = FALSE
then
act1 : EB command := TRUE
end
Event Safe Failure =̂
when
grd1 : EB applied = FALSE∧EB command = FALSE
then
act1 : EB applied := TRUE
end
Event EB Normal =̂
when
grd1 : EB applied = FALSE∧EB command = FALSE
then
act1 : EB applied := TRUE
act2 : EB command := TRUE
end
END
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D.2 Stochastic Event B Option 1
Using fresh variables (c and n) to track the history for the probabilistic choice state-
ment. Time is updated implicitly as a result of the rate clauses.
MACHINE pEBv1
VARIABLES
EB applied
EB command
c
n
INVARIANTS
inv1 : EB applied ∈ BOOL
inv2 : EB command ∈ BOOL
inv3 : c ∈  
inv4 : n ∈  
exp1 : 0 ≡〉 n×λmax− c×λreq
EVENTS
Initialisation
begin
act1 : EB applied := FALSE
act2 : EB command := FALSE
act3 : c := 0
act4 : n := 0
end
Event Safe Failure =̂
when
grd1 : EB applied = FALSE∧EB command = FALSE
then
rate : λsafe
act1 : EB applied := TRUE
end
Event EB Request =̂
when
grd1 : EB applied = FALSE∧EB command = FALSE
then
rate : λreq
act1 : (EB command,c,n := TRUE,c+1,n+1) p⊕
(EB applied,EB command,n := TRUE,TRUE,n+1)
end
END
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D.3 Stochastic Event B Option 2
Updating time explicitly according to the exponential distribution. This removes the
need for variable n, c is still needed to track the occurrence of unsafe failures.
MACHINE pEBv2
VARIABLES
EB applied
EB command
c
time
INVARIANTS
inv1 : EB applied ∈ BOOL
inv2 : EB command ∈ BOOL
inv3 : c ∈  
inv4 : time ∈ REAL
exp1 : 0 ≡〉 time×λmax− c
EVENTS
Initialisation
begin
act1 : EB applied := FALSE
act2 : EB command := FALSE
act3 : c := 0
act4 : time := 0.0
end
Event Safe Failure =̂
when
grd1 : EB applied = FALSE∧EB command = FALSE
then
rate : λsafe
act1 : EB applied := TRUE
act2 : time := time+ exp(λsafe)
end
Event EB Request =̂
when
grd1 : EB applied = FALSE∧EB command = FALSE
then
rate : λreq
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act1 : (EB command,c := TRUE,c+1) p⊕
(EB applied,EB command := TRUE,TRUE)
act2 : time := time+ exp(λreq)
end
END
E Stochastic Event B Expectation Analysis
E.1 Option 1
In this section the proof is given of the following probabilistic invariant for the Stochas-
tic Event B model in which time is treated implicitly (option 1):
E =̂ n×λmax− c×λreq (18)
First it is required to show that the initialisation maintains the invariant. To do this
it is required to prove that:
0 ≡〉 [Initialisation]E (19)
Consider the right hand side of the inequality:
[Initialisation]E
≡ definition of Initialisation
[EB command,EB applied,c,n : = false, false,0,0]E
≡ definition of E
[EB command,EB applied,c,n : = false, false,0,0] (n×λmax− c×λreq)
≡ 0×λmax−0×λreq simple substitutions
≡ 0 arithmetic
Thus it has been shown that the initialisation event establishes the initial lower
bound of the expectation.
Next the EB Request event is considered, and it is proved that this maintains the
expectation. To do so it is required to show that:
E ≡〉 [EB Request]E (20)
Again consider the right hand side of this inequality:
[EB Request]E
≡ definition of EB Request and E
 EB command,c,n : = true,c+1,n+1
p⊕
EB command,EB applied,n : = true, true,n+1

(n×λmax− c×λreq)
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≡ probabilistic choice substitution p⊕
p ×
[EB command,c,n : = true,c+1,n+1] (n×λmax− c×λreq)
+(1−p) ×
[EB command,EB applied,n : = true, true,n+1] (n×λmax− c×λreq)
≡ parallel substitution and simple substitution
p × ((n+1)×λmax− (c+1)×λreq)
+ (1−p) × ((n+1)×λmax− c×λreq)
To maintain the expectation it is required that E ≤ [main]E, thus (from the above
substitutions) it is required that:
(n×λmax− c×λreq) ≤ p × ((n+1)×λmax− (c+1)×λreq)
+ (1−p)× ((n+1)×λmax− c×λreq)
≡ arithmetic
p×λreq ≤ λmax
E.2 Option 2
In this section the proof is given of the following probabilistic invariant for the Stochas-
tic Event B model in which time is treated explicitly (option 2):
E =̂ time×λmax− c (21)
First it is required to show that the initialisation maintains the invariant. To do this
it is required to prove that:
0 ≡〉 [Initialisation]E (22)
Consider the right hand side of the inequality:
[Initialisation]E
≡ definition of Initialisation
[EB command,EB applied,c, time : = false, false,0,0]E
≡ definition of E
[EB command,EB applied,c, time : = false, false,0,0] (time×λmax− c)
≡ 0×λmax−0 simple substitutions
≡ 0 arithmetic
Thus it has been shown that the initialisation event establishes the initial lower
bound of the expectation.
Next the EB Request event is considered and it is proved that this maintains the
expectation, to do so it is required to show that:
E ≡〉 [EB Request]E (23)
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Again consider the right hand side of this inequality:
[EB Request]E
≡ definition of EB Request and E


 EB command,c : = true,c+1
p⊕
EB command,EB applied : = true, true


||
time : = time+ exp(λreq)

(time×λmax− c)
≡ parallel substitution with p⊕


 EB command,c : = true,c+1||
time : = time+ exp(λreq)


p⊕
 EB command,EB applied : = true, true||
time : = time+ exp(λreq)




(time×λmax− c)
≡ probabilistic choice substitution p⊕
p ×
 EB command,c : = true,c+1||
time : = time+ exp(λreq)

(time×λmax− c)
+(1−p) ×
 EB command,EB applied : = true, true||
time : = time+ exp(λreq)

(time×λmax− c)
≡ exponential, parallel and simple substitution
p ×
((
time+ 1
λreq
)
×λmax− (c+1)
)
+ (1−p) ×
((
time+ 1
λreq
)
×λmax− c
)
To maintain the expectation it is required that E ≤ [main]E, thus (from the above
substitutions) it is required that:
(time×λmax− c) ≤ p ×
((
time+ 1
λreq
)
×λmax− (c+1)
)
+ (1−p)×
((
time+ 1
λreq
)
×λmax− c
)
≡ arithmetic
p×λreq ≤ λmax
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